Ocean and Coastal Law Journal
Volume 22 | Number 1

Article 4

February 2017

The Arctic Council: Twenty Years in the Making
and Moving Forward
Matthew Richwalder
University of Maine School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj
Recommended Citation
Matthew Richwalder, The Arctic Council: Twenty Years in the Making and Moving Forward, 22 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 22 (2017).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj/vol22/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Ocean and Coastal Law Journal by an authorized editor of University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact mdecrow@maine.edu.

THE ARCTIC COUNCIL: TWENTY YEARS IN THE MAKING AND MOVING FORWARD
BY:
MATTHEW RICHWALDER
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STRATEGY
III. INITIAL GOALS OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL
IV. HOW THE ARCTIC COUNCIL FUNCTIONS AND WHAT THE COUNCIL DOES IN PRACTICE
A. Senior Arctic Officials (SAO)
B. Working Groups
C. The Secretariat
D. Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP)
E. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP)
F. Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF)
G. Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response (EPPR)
H. Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME)
I. Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG)
J. Legally Binding Documents Created by the Arctic Council
V. INCREASING TERRITORIAL CLAIMS
VI. THE UNITED STATES’ ROLE IN THE ARCTIC COUNCIL IN THE REGION
VII. MOVING FORWARD
VIII. CONCLUSION

22

ABSTRACT
This comment is about the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council (the Council) is an intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation and interaction among the Arctic states, indigenous
peoples, and other inhabitants of the Arctic region on issues of sustainability and environmental
protection. The Council has eight member States: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Canada,
United States, Russia, and Iceland. There are also observer States, who are non-Arctic countries
and permanent participants, six indigenous peoples groups living in the Arctic. This comment
delves into the history of the Council, discusses its starting goals, and how it has evolved over
the last twenty years. This comment also explores the current state of the Council and the
increasing amount of tension between Arctic States and non-Arctic States as the Arctic sea ice
disappears, more travel routes open, new territory emerges, and the prospect of natural resources
that have yet to be tapped into. Lastly, this comment will present some recommendations for
how the Council should handle the changing conditions and relationships amongst the Arctic
countries, non-Arctic countries, and indigenous people.
KEY TERMS
Admiralty, Environmental Law, International Law, Law of the Sea, and Natural Resources Law.

23

I. INTRODUCTION
The Arctic Council (the Council) is an inter-governmental forum promoting cooperation
and interaction among the Arctic states, indigenous peoples, and other inhabitants of the Arctic
region on issues of sustainability and environmental protection.1 The Council consists of eight
member states: Sweden, Finland, Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Iceland, the United States,
Norway, and the Russian Federation.2 Additionally, the status of permanent participants was
given to six organizations representing Arctic indigenous peoples.3 The permanent participant
category was created to allow for active participation and consultation with the Arctic indigenous
peoples.4 The permanent participants include the Aleut International Association, the Arctic
Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian
Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council.5 Lastly, the category of
observer status was created for non-Arctic states, along with inter-governmental, interparliamentary, global, regional, and non-government organizations for the ability to contribute to
the Arctic Council.6
Twenty years ago, on September 19, 1996, the Declaration on the Establishment of the
Arctic Council was signed in Ottawa, Canada, formally establishing the Arctic Council.7 The
Arctic Council was created to provide a forum for Arctic states to consider sustainability and
environmental issues, but in 2015 there several factors drastically changed the Arctic and calling
into question the role of the Council.
The Arctic is a vast ice-covered ocean -- a tree-less, frozen ground replete with life,
including fish and marine mammals, organisms living in the ice, human societies, birds, and land
mammals.8 Climate change is causing global ocean and surface temperatures to rise. Arctic sea
ice reaches its minimum in September of each year.9 September Arctic Sea Ice is declining at a
rate of 13.3 percent per year.10 Additionally, Arctic Ocean temperatures were as much as four
degrees centigrade higher than the 1982-2012 mean temperature in the Bering Strait and Laptev
Sea region.11
The rapidly changing Arctic environment has created a host of problems including
reduction of sea ice, loss of wildlife habitat, loss of living space for human societies, and rising
1

The Arctic Council: A Backgrounder, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us (last
updated May 23, 2016).
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The Arctic Council, Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Joint Communique of the
Governments of the Arctic Countries on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, (September 19, 1996).
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Arctic Report Card, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/Report-Card/ReportCard-2016/ArtMID/5022/ArticleID/286/Sea-Ice (last visited Dec. 27, 2016), https://www.climate.gov/newsfeatures/understanding-climate/climate-change-minimum-arctic-sea-ice-extent (last visited Dec. 27, 2016).
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Arctic Sea Ice Minimum, NASA: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/arctic-seaice/ (last updated Aug. 29, 2016).
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M.L. Timmermans & A. Proshutinsky, Arctic Ocean Sea Surface Temperatures, in NAT’L OCEANIC AND
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., ARCTIC REPORT CARD 2014, 39 (M.O. Jeffries et. al. eds. 2014).
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sea levels. Additionally, the melting sea ice is opening new shipping lanes and allowing passage
to areas of the Arctic Ocean that have not been accessible for thousands of years. This creates
problems around territorial rights of the ocean, mineral and oil rights, fishing rights, and shipping
routes, and this list is not exhaustive. Given all of these changes in the Arctic, questions of the
Arctic Council’s role in the region are increasingly important.
This comment will provide an overview of the history and stated goals of the Arctic
Council. This comment will, additionally, analyze what the Arctic Council does and what the
Council should do. Further, the future of the council and some alternatives to its current
organization and role internationally will be discussed. First, this comment will analyze the early
manifestations of the Arctic Council as represented by the Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy and the starting goals of the Council. Whether the Council has met these goals and to
what extent these goals have evolved will also be discussed. Second, this comment will discuss
the history of the Council and its trends over the course of its existence. Third, this comment will
analyze what the Council does and its functions and what the Arctic Council should look like and
how it should function. Additionally, this comment will discuss the increasing territorial claims
being made by Arctic countries and the presence of non-Arctic countries in the Arctic.
Considering the United States is an Arctic country and member of the Council, America’s
actions or inactions will be analyzed. Finally, this comment will explore the Council’s
alternatives, specifically, whether the Council should continue to function as it currently does or
take on new role where the Council becomes a “hard law” generating body, a policy-shaping
entity or a policy-making entity, or a combination of the two.
II. THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STRATEGY
The first step of an attempt for Arctic-wide cooperation was launched in 1987 by the
Soviet Union’s then-Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev in Murmansk, where he proposed that
the Arctic countries come together and cooperate on various issues, including protection of the
Arctic environment.12 In 1989, Finland convened a conference in Rovaniemi of the eight Arctic
states (Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the United States, the then Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, Canada, and Iceland) to discuss cooperative measures on the protection of the Arctic
environment.13 The Rovaniemi Conference agreed to work towards gathering a meeting of the
circumpolar Ministers responsible for Arctic environmental issues.14 Between 1989 and 1990,
two preparatory meetings were convened in Yellowknife, Canada and Kiruna, Sweden before the
second meeting in Rovaniemi in June 1991, where the eight Arctic states and several concerned
nations and groups signed the Rovaniemi Declaration and adopted the Arctic Environmental
Protection Strategy (AEPS).15
AEPS was designed to be carried out through national legislation and in compliance with
international law, including customary international law reflected in the 1982 United Nations
12

For a much more detailed history of the Arctic Council and the early stages of the Arctic environmental protection
movement, see Timo Koivurova & David L. Vanderzwaag, The Arctic Council at 10 Years: Retrospect and
Prospects, 40 U.B.C. L. Rev. 121 (2007).
13
Declaration on the Protection of Arctic Environment: Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, The Arctic
Council, (June 14, 1991).
14
Id. at 1.
15
Id.
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Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS).16 The AEPS objectives were ambitious, which is
evident in its final, overarching goal, “to identify, reduce, and . . . eliminate pollution.”17 Other
stated objectives included the protection of the Arctic ecosystem including humans, to provide
for the “protection, enhancement and restoration of environmental quality and the sustainable
utilization of natural resources,” which included the use of natural resources by local and
indigenous peoples.18 Additionally, the recognition and accommodation of the traditional and
cultural values and practices by indigenous peoples was to be considered in relation to the
protection of the Arctic environment.19 A final objective was to regularly review the state of the
Arctic environment.20
An additional lasting legacy of AEPS was the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment
Program (AMAP), which was created in an effort by the eight Arctic countries recognizing the
Arctic as a pristine and diverse ecosystem of great “importance to preserve and protect.”21
AMAP was further recognition that pollutants arriving in the Arctic originated in the midlatitudes by anthropogenic activities and transported to the Arctic by oceans and rivers and
atmospheric processes.22 The Arctic countries also identified that the exploitation of natural
resources paralleling urban and industrial expansion within the Arctic region contributed to the
“degradation of the Arctic environment and affected the living conditions for the inhabitants of
the region.”23
Therefore, the principle purpose of AMAP was the observation of the levels of
anthropogenic pollutants and the “assessment of their effects in relevant component parts of the
Arctic environment.”24 AMAP also was significant in that it noted a major threat to the Arctic
environment “may come from climate change, induced by global warming, and the effects of
stratospheric ozone depletion.”25 The recognition that anthropogenic activities were the source of
harmful pollutants in the Arctic and that changes in the environment were also a result of climate
change is significant in that the eight Arctic countries were formally acknowledging that climate
change and negative environmental changes were occurring.
AEPS constitutes the early manifestations of the Arctic Council and the
acknowledgement by concerned countries of the impact that pollution and anthropogenic
activities are having on the natural environment. Now, this comment will shift to the actual birth
of the Council and its starting goals.
III. INITIAL GOALS OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL
The Arctic Council was formally established on September 19, 1996 in Ottawa, Canada
with the signing of the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (also known as the
16
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Ottawa Declaration).26 The eight arctic states affirmed their commitment to the well-being of the
Arctic inhabitants and the commitment to sustainable development of the Arctic region including
improved health conditions, social development, and cultural well-being.27 Further, the
declaration reaffirmed the commitment to the protection of the Arctic environment, including the
overall health of Arctic ecosystems, maintenance of biodiversity, and conservation and
sustainable use of natural resources.28
The Ottawa Declaration recognized the traditional knowledge of the indigenous peoples
of the Arctic and their communities, and their place within the Arctic community. Additionally,
it was considering the role of Arctic science and research to the “collective understanding” of the
Arctic.29 The declaration, further, acknowledged the contribution and support of the organized
indigenous groups, such as the Inuit Circumpolar Conference and the Saami Council, in the
creation of the Arctic Council.30 All of this was meant to provide for “regular intergovernmental
consideration of and consultation on Arctic issues,” involving the Arctic states and indigenous
communities.31
The Council was established as a high level forum to provide “a means for promoting
cooperation, coordination and interaction” amongst the Arctic States with inclusion and
involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities on Arctic issues of “sustainable development
and environmental protection.”32 Additionally, the Ottawa Declaration expressly noted that the
Council should not deal with military security.33
A second stated goal was to “oversee and coordinate” the programs established by the
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) which is accomplished through the Council’s
working groups.34 The working groups were established to carry out the primary work of the
Council. The third stated goal adopted “terms of reference for, and oversee and coordinate a
sustainable development program.”35 Lastly, the declaration sought to “disseminate information,
encourage education and promote interest in Arctic related issues.”36
From the declaration of September 1996, it is clear that the creation of the Arctic Council
was only a means to establish a cooperative and collaborative forum for the Arctic States,
indigenous communities of the Arctic, and observer states to come together and discuss issues
concerning the Arctic. To this end, the Joint Communique of the Governments of the Arctic
Countries on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, specifically stated that the Council will be
a “mechanism for addressing the common concerns and challenges faced by their governments
and the people of the Arctic.”37 Further, the Communique expressly noted the desire to focus on
26

The Arctic Council, Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Joint Communique of the
Governments of the Arctic Countries on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, September 19, 1996.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 2
30
Id. at 3
31
Id. at 2
32
Id. (Art. 1(a))
33
Id. (FN 1)
34
Id. (Art. 1(b))
35
Id. (Art. 1(c))
36
Id. (Art. 1(d))
37
Id. at 5

27

the “protection of the Arctic environment and sustainable development as a means of improving
the economic, social, and cultural well-being of the North.”38
The Council was established to promote research and awareness of Arctic specific issues
and to facilitate conversations on the particular problems facing the environment and people of
the Arctic. Additionally the Council specifically stated in a footnote that it will stay out of
matters of military security, indicating that it intended to stay out of the realm of politics and
government. Further, the declaration also signaled that the Council will not be a policy making
or law producing entity.
The question is, has the Council met the goals laid out in the Ottawa Declaration? The
first goal of providing a forum for promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction for the
overarching goal of sustainable development and environmental protection of the Arctic has been
met by the Council. The Council allows for the eight Arctic states and indigenous peoples of the
Arctic, with the addition of the observer states, a means to meet, interact, and raise issues
concerning sustainability of the Arctic and environmental protection. This is further seen in the
establishment of the six working groups that carry out the work of the Council.
The second goal to oversee and coordinate the programs established under the AEPS is
largely carried out by the six working groups. However, the working groups act independently of
each other and are not cohesive as a collective group. The other goals of creating a sustainable
development initiative and to encouraging and promoting interest in the Arctic are carried out
through the work of the working groups and the overall function and presence of the Arctic
Council internationally.
Even though the Council has largely met its stated goals, there remains the question of
whether the Council should do more. Should the Council become more than an entity that creates
“soft law” or non-legally binding initiatives and directives? Or, should the Council, instead, be a
“hard law” creating entity that produces legal doctrine and laws that must be followed by the
member states, indigenous groups, observer states, and any other state that seeks to operate in the
Arctic region? This will be addressed in more depth in later sections of this paper. For now, the
Council has been successful in carrying out its mission in providing a forum for research and
cooperation among member states, indigenous inhabitants, and observer states about sustainable
development and environmental protection. However, as conditions in the Arctic are rapidly
changing environmentally, politically, and economically, the Council’s current role is not as
aggressive as it could or should be in facing these challenges. If the Council is to provide a
forum for cooperation, interaction, and collaboration, it should seek to be in a more assertive and
authoritative position in terms of policy making.
IV. HOW THE ARCTIC COUNCIL FUNCTIONS AND WHAT THE COUNCIL DOES IN PRACTICE
The Arctic Council is organized into an operational framework through which the
Council performs its activities. The framework primarily consists of:
1. Senior Arctic Officials
2. Working Groups
3. The Secretariat
A. Senior Arctic Officials (SAO)
38
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Each Arctic State designates a SAO, which is generally a senior government official who
is responsible for Arctic affairs.39 Permanent participants also designate a representative, to act
as a point person for Council related activities.40 The chairmanship provides a chairperson for
SAO meetings, which is subject to the concurrence of the Arctic States present at SAO
meetings.41 SAOs receive reports from working groups, task forces and other subsidiary bodies;
the SAOs then discuss and evaluate reports.42 Further, the SAOs coordinate and monitor
activities in accordance with decisions and instructions of the Council.43 The SAOs review and
make recommendations to the Council on proposals by members that are then submitted to a
Ministerial meeting.44 Finally, SAO meetings occur at least two times a year.45
B. Working Groups
The Council’s work is carried out in six working groups.46 The themes of the working
groups cover a broad range from emergency response procedures to climate change and
pollution.47 The six working groups of the Council are; the Arctic Contaminants Actions
Programme (ACAP), the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), the
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and
Response (EPPR), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), and the Sustainable
Development Working Group (SDWG).48 In addition, the Council has produced legally binding
agreements on search and rescue procedures and oil spill preparedness and prevention
procedures.
The working groups are made up of expert level representatives from sectoral ministries,
government agencies, and researchers.49 Each individual working group consists of a specific
operational mandate, a Chair, a management board or steering committee, and support by a
secretariat.50 Included in the management boards are representatives of national governmental
agencies of the Council states who are connected to the mandates of the working groups and
representatives of the permanent participants.51 Observer states and groups will attend working
group meetings and participate in projects.52 Additionally, the working groups have invited
guests and/or experts in attendance of their meetings.53 It is the burden of the working groups to
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carry out the projects and programs ordered by the Council Ministers.54 The mandates are
official documents stated in Ministerial Declarations which come out of Ministerial meetings.55
Each specific working group will be laid out in more detail below.
C. The Secretariat
The Secretariat performs secretarial and administrative services for the Council and
provides various other forms of support.56 More specifically, the Secretariat functions as
administrative and organizational support, from arranging and servicing meetings to assisting the
Chair in drafting meetings documents and final reports.57 The Secretariat performs
communication and outreach support, financial and human resources support, possessing the
capability to translate documents and communications, and any other services and functions as
required or directed by the Council and the Chair.58 The Secretariat is appointed as Director by
the SAOs who are nationals of the Arctic States.59 The Director assumes overall responsibility
for management and administration of the Secretariat.60 Finally, the Director reports to the
SAOs, receives tasks from the SAO Chair, consults the Chair for matters of importance, and is
responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the Secretariat.61
Shifting focus back to the working groups, a more detailed view of the various working
groups and the two legally binding documents produced by the Council will now be discussed.
D. Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP)
ACAP’s current chairmanship is Sweden and the chairperson is Ulrik Westman.62
ACAP’s objective is to “prevent adverse effects from, reduce, and ultimately eliminate pollution
of the Arctic environment.”63 ACAP concentrates on Arctic pollution sources and performs as a
support mechanism to “encourage national actions to reduce emissions and other releases of
pollutants that are relevant in the Arctic.”64 ACAP became the sixth permanent working group in
2006.65 Originally, ACAP was created as a Council plan to target Arctic pollution sources
identified through AMAP.66 ACAP states that cooperative actions are necessary to make
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“important and significant contributions to the overall international effort to reduce
environmental damage on a global level.”67
National delegations of the Arctic states represent ACAP and permanent participants
participate in ACAP meetings as well.68 The chairmanship leads ACAP’s work and rotates
between Arctic states every two years.69 Organizational issues are handled by the Chair, ViceChair, and Executive Secretary.70 “The Vice-Chair [typically] represents the State that will
[assume] the chairmanship in the [next] term.”
Within ACAP are four expert groups working to develop action plans to reduce pollution
in the Arctic environment.71 The first expert group is the POPs (persistent organic contaminants)
& Mercury group which coordinates and facilitates Council projects that reduce the emission of
mercury into the environment, presents results, and coordinates between projects.72 The second
is the expert group on Integrated Hazardous Wastes.73 The third expert group is the Indigenous
Peoples Contaminant Action Program (IPCAP).74 IPCAP was created through an initiative by
permanent participants of the Council to address “contaminant issues in indigenous peoples’
communities in remote areas of the Arctic.”75 The initiative was approved by the Council at
Ministerial Meetings in Salekhard and Tromso.76 IPCAP works to target reduction of exposure
and impact of contaminants in indigenous peoples’ communities.77 The fourth expert group is the
Short Lived Climate Pollutants Expert Group (SLCP EG).78 SLCP EG’s objective is to “facilitate
projects with an initial focus on activities that reduce emissions of black carbon contamination
that transports and deposits in the Arctic.”79
E. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP)
AMAP’s current chairmanship resides in Finland and the chair is Martin Forsius.80
AMAP is responsible for “providing reliable and sufficient information on the status of, and
threats to, the Arctic environment, and providing scientific advice on the actions to be taken . . .
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to support Arctic governments in their efforts to take remedial and preventive actions.”81
AMAP’s objectives are to:
● monitor and assess the status of the Arctic region in regards to pollution and
climate change;
● to document levels and trends, pathways and processes, and effects on ecosystems
and humans, and recommend actions to reduce threats for governments; and
● produce science-based, policy-relevant assessments and public outreach
information to educate policy and decision-making processes.82
Further, AMAP is perceived as a process “integrating both monitoring and assessment
activities.”83 The process works to produce assessment reports on pollution and climate status
and trends in Arctic ecosystems; to identify causes for changing conditions; to detect new
problems, their causes and potential risks to the ecosystem and indigenous peoples and residents
of the Arctic; and to recommend required actions.84
AMAP also measures the levels and assesses the effects of anthropogenic pollutants in all
of the Arctic environment; examines the impact of pollutants on the Arctic’s flora and fauna,
particularly ones used by indigenous people; reporting on the status of the Arctic environment;
and providing advice and recommendations to Ministers on priority actions required to improve
the Arctic environment.85
AMAP’s priorities include issues surrounding persistent organic pollutants and POPs,
heavy metals (in particular mercury, cadmium, and lead), radioactivity, oil and gas pollution, the
impacts of acidifying gases and Arctic haze, climate change, and stratospheric ozone depletion.86
Further, AMAP’s current priorities revolve around Arctic cryospheric change, Arctic Ocean
acidification, and the impacts of short-lived climate forcers such as black carbon, methane, and
tropospheric ozone.87
F. Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF)
The current chairmanship of CAFF is located in Norway and presided over by the chair,
Reidar Hindrum. CAFF represents the “biodiversity working group” of the Council.88 Each
Council state assigns a National Representative to CAFF, along with representatives of the
Indigenous Peoples’ organizations acting as Permanent Participants, and Council observer
countries and organizations.89 CAFF serves as a mechanism for:
81
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● cooperation on species and habitat management;
● sharing information on management techniques and regulatory regimes; and
● facilitation of more knowledgeable decision-making.90
CAFF also facilitates the development of common responses on important issues for the
ecosystem including the “development and economic pressures, conservation opportunities, and
political commitments.”91
CAFF is mandated to target “conservation of Arctic biodiversity, and to communicate its
findings to the governments and residents of the Arctic.”92 Further, CAFF helps to promote
practices to ensure the sustainability of Arctic living resources.93 CAFF carries out this work
through expert groups94 which provide a forum for scientists, managers, and conservationists to
promote and facilitate research, coordinate conservation, and management.95 CAFF’s work is
also carried out through monitoring assessments which “describe the current state of Arctic
ecosystems and wildlife using the best available scientific and Traditional Ecological
Knowledge.”96
CAFF projects “provide data for informed decision making to resolve challenges arising
from trying to conserve the natural environment and permit regional growth.97 CAFF’s work
requires cooperation between all Arctic countries, international conventions and organizations,
and indigenous groups, and is guided by the CAFF Strategic Plan for the Conservation of Arctic
Biological Diversity and biennial Work Plans.98
One of CAFF’s missions is to develop the “framework and tools necessary to create a
baseline of current knowledge, and to provide dynamic assessments over time.”99 This is
necessary to conserve the natural environment, promote economic development, and require
comprehensive baseline data to record status and trends of Arctic biodiversity, habitats, and
ecosystems.100
G. Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response (EPPR)
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EPPR’s current chairmanship resides in the United States and is chaired by Amy A.
Merten.101 EPPR was established under AEPS in 1991.102 EPPR reports directly to the Council
through Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) and receives mandates through Ministerial meetings.103
EPPR meets two times a year, once in a full meeting and one time where heads of delegation
must be present.104 EPPR’s goal is to “contribute to the protection of the Arctic environment
from the threat or impact that may result from an accidental release of pollutants or
radionuclides.105
EPPR’s role within the Council is to address “various aspects of prevention, preparedness
and response to environmental emergencies in the Arctic.”106 Working group members share
information on “best practices and conduct projects to include development of guidance and risk
assessment methodologies, response exercises, and training.”107 Further, EPPR works with the
other Working Groups and organizations to assure that emergencies are correctly addressed in
Council work.108 In addition, EPPR maintains a liaison within the oil industry and other industry
organizations to work on strengthening oil spill prevention and preparedness.109
H. Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME)
Due to increasing economic activity and climate change there is increased use of the
Arctic and with that comes threats to the Arctic marine and coastal environment. As indicated in
the working group’s title, PAME’s work is directed towards protection of the Arctic marine
environment. PAME is mandated to “address policy and non-emergency pollution prevention
and control measures related to the protection of the arctic marine environment from both land
and sea-based activities.”110 The current chairmanship of the working group is Canada and is
chaired by Renee Sauve.111
A project under PAME auspices is the Arctic Ocean Review (AOR) led by Iceland,
Canada, Norway, Russia, and the United States.112 AOR was agreed on by the Council at its
2009 Ministerial Meeting as a follow-up to the 2004 marine strategic plan which stated that from
time to time the Council shall “review the status and adequacy of international/regional
agreements and standards that have application in the Arctic marine environment, new scientific
knowledge of emerging substances of concern, and analyze the applicability of a regional seas
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agreement.”113 AOR produces reports on global and regional measures in place for conservation
and sustainable uses of the Arctic. Further, the program draws from existing research and data
and is not a new assessment. AOR was established to provide updates on the state of the Arctic’s
natural environment and sustainability practices already in action.
Another important work of PAME was the Arctic Council Offshore Oil and Gas
Guidelines report (2009). The report was “intended to be of use to the Arctic nations for offshore
oil and gas activities during planning, exploration, development, production, and
decommissioning.”114 The oil and gas guidelines are an example of the “soft law” capability of
the Working Groups and the Council as a whole. The oil and gas guidelines were “intended to
define a set of recommended practices and outline strategic actions for consideration by those
responsible for regulation of offshore oil and gas activities.”115 The guidelines were a set of
regulations intended to be a reference or a guide to countries and companies exploring and
drilling for offshore gas and oil in the Arctic. The introduction to the guidelines acknowledged
that the member states have different systems and regulations already in place with varying
degrees of emphases and responsibilities between operators and regulators.116 However, the
report’s stated goal is to “assist regulators in developing standards, which are applied and
enforced consistently for all offshore Arctic oil and gas operations.”117
A third project of PAME is the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) which was
adopted by Council Ministers in 2004 at the 4th Arctic Council meeting.118 PAME was tasked to
“conduct a comprehensive Arctic marine shipping assessment” under the auspices of the Arctic
Marine Strategic Plan and through the guidance of Canada, Finland, and the United States and in
collaboration with the EPPR, other Working Groups, member states, and permanent
participants.119 The Council ordered this assessment based on a finding by the Arctic Climate
Impact Assessment which recognized the reduction in sea ice will likely increase marine
transportation and access to Arctic resources.120
AMSA was designed to be circumpolar and consider regional and local perspectives.121
The central focus was on ships and their use in the Arctic Ocean, potential impacts on humans
and the marine environment, and infrastructure requirements.122 The AMSA was a collaboration
amongst member states, and various stakeholders including shipping companies, designers,
shipbuilders, marine insurers, and shipping associations to name but a few.123 The AMSA
provided a broad array of recommendations and reports on current and future Arctic marine
activity and is a representation of what the Council was designed to do and can accomplish.
However, it is another example of “soft law” or non-legally binding directives. AMSA is
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designed to be used as recommendations or guidelines, which means Arctic countries, non-Arctic
countries, and private shipping vessels may or may not even follow or consider them.
I. Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG)
The current chairmanship of SDWG is the United States and chaired by Roberta Burns.124
The mandate and goal of SDWG is clear: to “propose and adopt steps to be taken by the Arctic
States to advance sustainable development in the Arctic.”125 Further, SDWG provides
opportunities to “protect and enhance the environment and the economies,” and the “culture and
health of indigenous peoples and Arctic communities.”126 Additionally, SDWG is guided by a
tenet to “pursue initiatives that provide practical knowledge and contribute to building the
capacity of indigenous peoples and Arctic communities to respond to the challenges and
benefits” of the opportunities provided in the Arctic region.127
In sum, the working groups function as the Council intended them to: to be specialized
forums for research, collaboration, monitoring, and assessment among other things. At most,
they produce reports, assessments, recommendations, and guidelines. Generally, they do not
produce legally binding initiatives nor do they have a policy making agenda.
J. Legally Binding Documents Created by the Arctic Council
The Council has produced two legally binding agreements: Agreement on Cooperation
on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, and Agreement on Cooperation
on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. These documents indicate that
the Council can mandate the creation and implementation of legally binding documents.
The Arctic Council, at the 2009 Ministerial Meeting in Tromso, Norway, mandated the
creation of a Task Force to develop an “international instrument for cooperation on search and
rescue operations in the Arctic.”128 This undertaking led to the first-ever legally binding
document produced and negotiated under the authority of the Arctic Council.129 The Agreement
on Cooperation on the Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic was signed at
the Nuuk Ministerial Meeting in 2011, and became effective in January 2013.130 The Agreement
recognizes the challenges imposed on search and rescue operation in the “harsh” Arctic climate
and the importance of providing rapid assistance to people in distress.131 Further, the Agreement
acknowledged and emphasized the importance of cooperation among the Arctic states in
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conducting search and rescue operations and the usefulness of exchanging information and
experience.132
The Agreement sets the framework for search and rescue operations in the Arctic and
how states should respond and cooperate with other search agencies. For example, under Article
9, Cooperation Among the Parties, parties shall enhance cooperation amongst themselves and
“exchange information that may serve to improve the effectiveness of search and rescue
operations.”133 The exchange of information may include, and is not limited to, information such
as: communication details; lists of available airfields, ports, refueling and resupply capabilities;
and knowledge of fueling, supply, and medical facilities.134 All of which can be vital in a search
and rescue operation where time is of the essence and further allows and encourages cooperation
and collaboration. The Agreement establishes rescue coordination centers throughout the Arctic
and outlines the conduct of aeronautical and maritime search and rescue operations.135 Further,
the Agreement provides a means for a party to request entry into the territory of another party for
the purpose of search and rescue operations. The requesting party shall send its request to the
relevant agency, the receiving party shall immediately confirm the receipt and advise as soon as
possible as to whether entry may be permitted and the conditions under which the mission can be
undertaken, and both parties shall see to the most expeditious border crossing procedure
possible.136
The Arctic is a vast, undeveloped, and largely unpopulated region that experiences some
of the world’s worst winter weather conditions. When problems occur in the Arctic, the direness
of the situation for humans becomes even more immediate and every minute counts for search
and rescue operations. This Agreement establishes procedures for search and rescue and
facilitates cooperation. In search and rescue, every second counts; territorial boundaries and
politics should not hold rescuers back.
The second agreement produced by the Council is the Agreement on Cooperation on
Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. Another Task Force was
mandated to prepare an instrument on Arctic marine oil pollution preparedness and response at
the Ministerial Meeting in Nuuk in 2011.137 This was the second legally binding document
created by the Council and was signed at the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting in May 2013.138
The objective of the second agreement is to “strengthen cooperation, coordination and
mutual assistance among the Parties on oil pollution preparedness and response in the Arctic in
order to protect the marine environment from pollution by oil.”139 Like the first agreement, the
second provides a framework for Arctic States to work from in the event an oil spill occurs and
guidance on cooperation and coordination amongst several States. The agreement mandates that
each state “shall maintain a national system for responding promptly and effectively to oil
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pollution incidents.”140 The agreement provides that States must establish a system of authorities
and contact points for prompt and effective response and for notification of oil spill events.141
The Agreement further provides procedures for monitoring for oil spills and pollution, for the
ability to request assistance for response operations, and for the movement and removal of
resources across States’ borders.142
As described above, the unique environmental and geographic conditions make time of
the essence in the Arctic. The Arctic’s ecosystem is very fragile, making environmental impacts
from oil spills and pollution all the more hazardous and destructive to environmental quality,
marine life, mammals, and the indigenous inhabitants of the region. This agreement establishes
the methods and procedures for cooperation and quick response in the event an accident in the
open seas or an oil spill occurs.
The agreements are significant in that they show the Council can and is willing to
produce legally binding documents to be followed by member States. Further, these documents
create the reality that more agreements can be negotiated and produced under the auspices of the
Arctic Council.
However, with decreasing sea ice and opening of travel routes through the Arctic, more
States are becoming interested in the Arctic and further, Arctic States are beginning to stake their
claims as the sea ice disappears and the potential for mineral and natural resource wealth is
realized. Do these issues signal that the Council should create more legally binding agreements
covering various aspects or should the Council begin creating a stronger body of law governing
issues in the Arctic?
In short, the Council, if it views itself as a facilitator, mediator, and a unifying force in
Arctic diplomacy, must become a stronger legal authority amongst the Arctic countries in order
to protect the Arctic’s environment and maintain the peace in the region that the Council strives
for. This issue will be discussed more fully below, first by analyzing the increasing international
claims being made in the Arctic by both Arctic and non-Arctic countries, and secondly, by
discussing the United States’ actions, or more aptly, inaction in the Arctic region.
V. INCREASING TERRITORIAL CLAIMS
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is a multilateral treaty
that clarifies maritime zones and nation-state rights and obligations pertaining to the oceans. The
instrument was concluded in 1982 and has been adopted by most nations around the world. The
United States is not a party to UNCLOS, but observes its provisions that reflect customary
international law. The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is an area “beyond and adjacent to the
territorial sea . . . under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and
freedoms of other States are governed.”143 Further, within the EEZ of a coastal State, the State
has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the
natural resources . . . of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and subsoil.”144
Additionally, in instances where the continental shelf extends beyond the 200 nautical mile limit,
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the coastal state may claim an additional 150 miles from its baseline.145 Therefore, countries such
as Canada and Russia with a tremendous amount of their Arctic borders touching the Arctic
Ocean stand to gain a lot, or lose, depending on how the Arctic is governed moving forward.
In December 2014, Denmark staked a claim to the North Pole, stating that under
UNCLOS, more than 900,000 square kilometers of Arctic Ocean north of Greenland belongs to
it.146 Greenland is under Denmark’s territorial jurisdiction. However, Denmark’s claim is not the
most profound statement of Arctic intentions, the most ambitious state appears to be Russia. In
August 2015, Russia claimed that over 460,000 square miles of Arctic territory belong to it.147
Russia has increasingly been showing its desire to be not just a major player in the Arctic but the
dominant power in the region. Russia is building 10 new search-and-rescue stations stretched out
along its Arctic shoreline and reopening military bases that were abandoned after the collapse of
the Soviet Union.148 Further, in March 2015, Russia carried out one of the largest military
exercises the far north has ever seen, involving 45,000 troops, dozens of ships and submarines,
and involving its strategic nuclear arsenal.149 Additionally, Russia has established two new army
brigades in the Arctic, one deployed only 30 miles from Finland’s border.150 Finally, in a
symbolic gesture dating back to 2007, two submersible Russian vessels planted a titanium
Russian flag 14,000 feet below the surface of the ocean on the seabed beneath the North Pole.151
Arctic States are not the only parties interested in the potentially lucrative economic and
natural resource prospects in the Arctic; South Korea, China, and Singapore have explored the
possibilities of commercial cargo shipments to be sent through the Arctic to European
markets.152 China refurbished an icebreaker in 2012 and sent it across one such Arctic route and
is now building a second icebreaker, which would give it an icebreaker fleet in the Arctic equal
to that of the United States.153 China has even announced that it is entering a new era, “striding
toward becoming a polar-region power.”154
The shrinking arctic sea ice will continue and with that comes the presence of Arctic and
non-Arctic countries in the region searching for shipping routes. Further, the prospects of
mineral wealth and natural resources underneath the Arctic Ocean has Arctic States jockeying
for territorial claims of the ocean and the seabed. For example, in January 2015, at a Russian
government-sponsored Arctic conference, scientists and economists predicted that in the sea
shelf being pursued by Russia, there is 90% of Russia’s remaining cobalt, nickel, and platinum,
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60% of copper, and almost all of its explored reserves of titanium, tin, and barite.155 In addition,
Russian scientists estimate the Arctic subsoil may hold as much as 70% to 90% of Russian
reserves of gold, diamonds, lead, bauxites and other minerals.156 These figures are just Russian
estimates, seven other countries will have claims to Arctic territory and the Russian estimates
mentioned do not take into account oil and gas reserves. The economic potential in minerals and
natural resources alone are potentially very significant.
The question arising is where does the Arctic Council fit into the equation? The Council
and its member States should consider giving the Council greater legal force, evolving it into an
organization that can regulate and police the Arctic in conjunction with other international
agencies and member States. Looking back on the Council’s starting goals, it expressly stated the
intention to stay out of military security, which it can still do but have increased political,
economic, and environmental authority.
Considering the potential mineral, oil, and gas reserves in the Arctic seabed,
environmental concerns should be at the forefront. This is an issue where the Council could play
a major role in influencing development and research of natural resources, maintaining high
environmental standards, and holding member states and non-member states accountable to
standards and rules. The Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and
Response in the Arctic is a starting point for environmental accountability in the Arctic, but the
Council must go further. The Council should create an environmental standards policy and set of
rules that must be agreed to and followed by all of the Arctic countries, indigenous groups, and
observer states. Additionally, the Council should seek the authority to reprimand violators of
environmental standards and even punish with fines or other measures.
In terms of security, the Council is in the position to facilitate an Arctic-wide security
policy. Through the Agreement on the Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the
Arctic, the Council has a starting point for security and safety agreements in the region, but as
mentioned above, the Council must go farther in protecting the region. The Council sits in a
position to serve a mediating function in gathering Arctic and non-Arctic countries and
negotiating issues such as maritime security, territorial claims, and other issues like military
security.
VI. THE UNITED STATES’ ROLE IN THE ARCTIC COUNCIL AND THE REGION
The United States became an Arctic nation in 1867 through the purchase of Alaska from
Russia. The U.S. continues to have many different, diverse, and compelling interests in the
Arctic including environmental protection, economic interests, national and homeland security,
sustainable development, promoting cooperation and collaboration with the other Arctic states,
involving indigenous Alaskans in decisions that concern them, and promoting and supporting
scientific research.158 The Council is the primary forum by which the U.S. engages in Arctic
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diplomacy.159 The U.S. Department of State leads the development of Arctic policy and working
in conjunction with other U.S. government agencies in promoting and driving policy objectives
in the region.160 Further, the Chairmanship of the Council currently resides with the United
States, which has a two year term in this role (2015-2017).161 The U.S. Chairmanship has “three
focus areas: Improving Economic and Living Conditions for Arctic Communities; Arctic Ocean
Safety, Security, and Stewardship; and Addressing the Impacts of Climate Change.”162
Additionally, the Council will hold its Senior Arctic Officials meeting in Portland, Maine in
October 2016.163
In 2013 the National Strategy for the Arctic Region was released. President Obama stated
that the “Arctic is one of our planet’s last great frontiers.”164 Further, the President stated that the
“Arctic region is peaceful, stable, and free of conflict,” where the U.S. and its Arctic allies “seek
to sustain this spirit of trust, cooperation and collaboration, both internationally and
domestically.”165 The strategy is put together through three goals: advancing U.S. security
interests; pursuing responsible Arctic region stewardship; and strengthening international
cooperation.166 The strategy’s main purposes are to protect U.S. interests both domestically and
internationally, to pursue and promote conservation efforts in the Arctic, and to strengthen
cooperation in the region among Arctic states and the entire international community.
Given that the U.S. was an original member of the Council, has various and significant
interests in the Arctic region, and is currently the chairmanship of the Council, the U.S.
presumably would be a leader in the Arctic region. Nevertheless, the U.S. is often viewed as
lagging behind the other Arctic and non-Arctic states, particularly economically, politically, and
militarily. As discussed above, Russia has made serious strides in the Region, so has Denmark,
and even Asian nations such as China, which has led to criticism of the U.S. for falling behind in
the region and possibly providing for the potential that the U.S. will need to undertake a major
catch-up operation in the area.
In September 2015, President Obama visited Alaska and became the first sitting U.S.
President to travel above the Arctic Circle. While there, the President’s major focus was on the
impact of climate change. The trip also included Mr. Obama’s national security advisor, Susan
Rice, possibly signaling that the melting ice in the Arctic has more consequences than just
environmental impact.167 As mentioned in the previous section, territorial claims and expansion
are increasing, and this has national-security implications for the United States. The U.S.,
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however, is poorly equipped to operate in the Arctic. The U.S. has two ice breakers to the
Russians’ forty.168 Further, during Mr. Obama’s visit of Alaska, five Chinese warships were in
international waters nearby, which can be viewed more as a power play than a mere
coincidence.169 Lastly, the Canadian military had finished Operation Nanook, an annual largescale military exercise to assert its Canadian sovereignty over its Arctic possessions.170
The current tension with Canada over the Northwest Passage further illustrates the
diplomatic quagmire facing the United States. Canada claims the channels between its Arctic
Islands connecting the Atlantic Ocean with the Beaufort Sea and north of Alaska are Canada’s
internal waters.171 The U.S., on the other hand, claims that the waterway is an international strait
where ships and aircraft from all countries have the right of uninterrupted transit passage.172 This
dispute has led to calls for the U.S. and Canada to resolve an agreement before “it is too late . . .
[t]he sea-ice is melting, foreign ships are coming, and there is little to stop an increasingly
assertive Russia from sending a warship through.”173
An August 30, 2015 New York Times article further highlighted the slow reaction the
U.S. has had in the region. Quoting Coast Guard commandant, Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, on U.S.
presence in the area the admiral stated, “We have been for some time clamoring about the
nation’s lack of capacity to sustain any meaningful presence in the Arctic.”174 Further, the
admiral stated that the U.S. “really isn’t even in this game,” referring to the America’s lack of
updated Coast Guard and Navy fleets, icebreakers, and overall presence in the Arctic.175
President Obama has shown increased interest in the Arctic, mostly through his climate
change initiatives and his trip to Alaska in 2015, but that trip resulted in little more than a welltimed publicity stunt in the run up to the 2015 Paris climate change conference. Further, the U.S.
in its chairmanship role of the Council has an increased interest and presence in the Arctic
diplomacy field as well. However, the U.S. must do more not only in climate change matters, but
also in national-security and international diplomacy.
The United States must increase its role in the Arctic in order to preserve peace among
Arctic States and to promote environmental and cultural sustainability. The U.S will need to
update its Coast Guard fleet, search and rescue stations, and icebreakers in the region. Further,
the U.S. may need to consider a greater naval presence in the area as well. The U.S. is,
additionally, positioned to be a world leader in research and finding preventative and restorative
methods for climate change. Additionally, the U.S. must be willing and even play a facilitating
role in encouraging the cooperation amongst Arctic states.
The existence of the Arctic Council provides (or could provide) the forum for Arctic
nations to address these national security issues that are arising with the melting sea-ice. Instead
of relying on talks between just the parties in a dispute, like the Northwest Passage dispute, the
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Council could serve as a facilitator, negotiator, and a mediator in disputes. Council members
could create a procedure for resolving disputes before having to resort to international litigation
at the International Court of Justice in the Hague. However, all of this requires the participants to
be willing to come together and achieve peaceful methods of resolution.
VII. MOVING FORWARD
In May 2013, the Arctic Council Secretariat released “Vision for the Arctic” at a meeting
in Kiruna, Sweden. This declaration came at the end of the first round of eight successive
chairmanships of the Council, meaning all eight original members had finished their first twoyear stints in the chairmanship position.176 This document first acknowledged and celebrated the
achievements that the Council has had since its inception and uses this forum to set forth the
Council’s mission or “vision” for the future.177 The document acknowledged the changes taking
place in the Arctic and the attention it is now receiving from around the globe, stating that the
Council must “look to the future, [] build on [their] achievements and [] continue to cooperate to
ensure that Arctic voices are heard and taken into account in the world.”178
Next, the Council maintains its core value, a peaceful Arctic, where there is no problem
that cannot be solved through cooperative relationships on the foundation of international law
and “good will.”179 Further, peace can be maintained through the foundation of the Law of the
Sea and through peaceful resolution of disputes.180 Here, the Council strives to maintain peace
among Arctic nations, peoples, and non-Arctic nations and will do so through established
methods such as international law, the Law of the Sea, and the Council’s past resolution of
disputes.
The Council, secondly, addresses the importance of the Arctic as a home and the wellbeing of the Arctic people as fundamental in regional development. The Council reaffirms its
commitment to the Arctic people to “safeguarding indigenous peoples’ rights, [] by creating
conditions for the preservation and development of social structure, cultural traditions, languages
and means of subsistence.”181 The Council’s undertaken responsibility for indigenous people of
the Arctic is admirable and something all nations, including the U.S. should strive for.
Third, the Council re-establishes its goal for a prosperous arctic, stating that the Arctic
has “enormous” economic potential and its “sustainable development is key to the region’s
resilience and prosperity.”182 The declaration stresses the importance of transparent and
predictable rules amongst Arctic nations along with continued cooperation and coordination in
the sustainability and development of the Arctic economy. The Council’s goal is to “build selfsufficient, vibrant and healthy Arctic communities for present and future generations.”183
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Fourth, the Council declares that the Arctic must remain and be safe both in the
environmental field and civil security.184 Fifth, the Council focuses in on a healthy Arctic
environment, citing the uniqueness and fragility of the Arctic environment. The Council is highly
concerned with climate change and will “continue to take action to reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases and short-lived climate pollutants, and support action that enables adaption.”185
The Council’s stated goal is to continue and strengthen work globally, address the environmental
challenges of the region and further, “remain committed to managing the region with an
ecosystem-based approach which balances conservation and sustainable use of the
environment.”186
The Council wants and desires a safe and healthy Arctic, not just for the indigenous
peoples of the region, but also for people and countries in the Arctic. The effects of climate
change has been an enormous concern of the Council since its birth and will continue to be. In
part, the Council will attempt this through continuing the tradition of Arctic knowledge, research
and interdisciplinary scientific approaches.187
Finally, the Council’s mission ends with the reinforcement of the need of a strong Arctic
Council. The declaration reaffirms the senior status and decision making power of the Arctic
States, stating “[d]ecisions at all levels of the Arctic Council are the exclusive right and
responsibility of the eight signatories to the Ottawa Declaration.”188 However, the declaration
encouraged participation by observers and the “full consultation” of the Arctic indigenous
peoples.189 Lastly, the declaration proclaims that the Council will “pursue opportunities to
expand the Arctic Council’s roles from policy-shaping into policy-making.”190
The “Vision for the Arctic” contains the sound and tone of a mission statement akin to
the Ottawa Declaration. To draw on an analogy, the “Vision for the Arctic” is the renewal of the
Arctic Council’s vows. There are many similarities between the two and the newer declaration
largely reaffirms the starting goals of the original and renews the Council’s commitment to these
goals. The newer declaration harkens on similar notions of finding peaceful resolutions to
problems and following international law in disputes. The Council asserts its commitment to the
indigenous peoples of the Arctic and to inhabitants of the region generally. Further, the Council
solidifies its stance on climate change and increasing research on environmental issues that are
Arctic specific and globally.
Most significantly, the “Vision for the Arctic” addresses the need for a strong Arctic
Council. This signals the Council’s recognition that it should act in a policy-making capacity as
opposed to a policy-shaping entity. By being a policy-making entity the Council can create
policy and drive those policies to meet its goals and the goals set for the Arctic countries and
indigenous groups, in contrast to adopting a policy created by another entity or country and
molding or forming it to fit the Council’s goals.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The concluding question is how should the Arctic Council function moving forward?
Arctic sea ice is and will continue to shrink thus opening the Arctic Ocean to shipping, tourism,
mineral exploration, oil and gas exploration and drilling, and territorial disputes, and this list is
not exhaustive. Further, how will disputes between various nations be dealt with and who will
deal with these disputes that arise? For example the current dispute over the Northwest Passage.
Should the resolution be left solely between the U.S. and Canada or does there need to be
another body that can mediate and negotiate a peaceful resolution without litigation in
international court? What would stop another nation like Russia or China from sailing into
Canada’s waters or Finland’s or Sweden’s?
The Arctic Council functions as a soft law body, meaning the Council does not create
legally binding law that binds its members. The Council has shown initiative in creating legally
binding documents such as the search and rescue plan and the oil spill and pollution prevention
plan. These two documents show the Council’s desire to unify its members on common issues
concerning the region. However, outside of these documents, unity and cohesion on other
matters are not present. Arctic and non-Arctic nations continue to squabble over territorial
boundaries and shipping lanes. As the sea ice melts and more of the Arctic Ocean is ice free,
tensions between nations will continue.
As it stands, the Council stays out of legal issues and leaves UNCLOS to address law of
the sea issues, as well as the International Maritime Organization. The “Vision for the Arctic”
indicates that the Council is willing to delve into the realm of policy making. More recently, the
Arctic Council held their Senior Arctic Officials meeting in Portland, Maine from October 4-6,
2016.191 The Senior Arctic Officials used this meeting to review and approve an updated
strategic plan for the ACAP working group, a new communication strategy, and agreed to
develop a new long-term strategic plan for the Council.192 The Portland meeting illustrated,
according to Ambassador John Bolton, Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials, the “cooperative
spirit and the urgency of the tasks at hand.”193 The Portland meeting signals that Arctic officials
recognize the need for cooperation and unity. However, in order to become an entity that creates
hard law or legally binding agreements that bind its members, more unity amongst the eight
member nations and agreement on common issues must occur.
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